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DISFRANOHISEMENT FROM PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.
in the broad sense of the term, maybe defined
as the act of depriving a member of a corporation of his right, as
such, by expulsion. The po)Ver of disfranchisement though vested
in many corporations cannot be exercised by them in an arbitrary
manner. Each corporator has a certain vested interest in the
franchise which, in itself, constitutes property, and of which he
cannot be deprived except for sufficient cause and in a proper
manner: State v. Georgia Medical Societyi, 33 Ga. 608., If 'the
corporation happen to own property, either real or personal, each
member has also a vested interest in that, of which he cannot
arbitrarily be stripped: Bvans v. The PhiladelphiaClub, 50 Penn.
St. 107. Hence "where any member of a corporation feels that
he is aggrieved or injured by the illegal or oppressive action of the
body it is his right to appeal to the courts for redress and protection ; and it is the right and duty of the court to investigate such
charges, when properly before it, and to judge of the legality
of the action of the corporation in expelling a member or depriving him of any other legal right:" State v. Georgia X2fedical'
Society, 38 Ga. 608; Bagg's Case, 11 Rep. 99.
The power of the courts is, however, confined to the affording
of a remedy in case of illegal disfranchisement. They have no
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power of themselves to disfranchise the members of a corporation:
Attorney-General v. -Earl of Clarendon, 17 Ves. 491; Neall v.
Hill et al., 16 Cal. 145. Unless, indeed, such power be expressly
conferred upon them by the charter, in which case it seems
probable that their jurisdiction would be exclusive, and the usual
powers of the corporate body in the premises ousted: People ex
rel. Gray v. Medical Society of the County of -Erie, 24 Barb.
570.
The aim of this article is to set out briefly the principles by
which the courts have been guided in their adjudications upon the
exercise of the right of disfranchisement by private corporations.
The subject falls naturally into three heads: 1. For what cause
may a member be disfranchised; 2. In what manner must a member be disfranchised; 3. In case of an illegal disfranchisement
what remedy will the courts afford.
I. For what cause may a member be disfranchised.
The right of disfranchising its members may either be expressly
conferred upon a corporation by the terms of its charter or implied
from the simple fact of the corporate existence. An express
authority to exercise this right may assume any one of several
shapes. A corporation may be empowered to expel its members
for any reasonable cause, in which case it seems that it is for the
corporate body, solely,'to say what is reasonable cause: inderwick
et al. v. Snell, 2 MeN. & G. 216.
Again, a corporation may be empowered to expel its members
for breaking the established rules and regulations to its injury.
Where this is the case the corporation has clearly the power of
establishing what lawful and reasonable rules and regulations it
pleases, and of expellin.g its members for such an infringement
of them as it deems prejudicial to its interests: Black and White
Smiths' Society v. V7andyke, 2 Whart. 309. Again, a corporation
may be empowered to expel any member in case he be detected in
the commission of a certain class of offences. Where this is the
case the corporation it seems has the exclusive power of determining whether any specific act comes within the class of offences
'which constitutes cause for expulsion: Commonwealth ex ret.
Bryan v. Pike Beneficial Society, 8 W. & S. 247.
In none of the three cases above mentioned will the courts
review
the action of the corporation, unless of course there be actual
mala fides shown. See _egina v. Governors of Darlington -ree
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Grammar School, 14 L. J. (Q. B.) 67; People ex rel. &tevenson
v. Higgins, 15 Ill. 110.
Charters, however, conferring such broad powers are not ordinarily granted, and where the courts are vested with the right of
incorporating societies, charters containing a grant of such powers
will not be approved: Butchers' Beneficial Association, 38 Penn.
St. 298; Beneficial Association of Brotherly Unity, 38 Id. 299.
Where the terms of a charter merely provide that the corporation
shall have power to disfranchise its members or to disfranchise them
when it sees fit, without distinctly specifying what shall constitute
sufficient cause, this will not be construed to vest in it any further
authority in this regard than it would have by implication independent of all charter provisions: State ex rel. Graham v. Ohamber of Commerce, 20 Wis. 63.
Corporations whose purposes are primarily or exclusively those
of gain have no power of disfranchisement, unless it is expressly
conferred by the charter: In re JLong island Railroad Co., 19
Wend. 37; Evans v. Philadelphia Club, 50 Penn. St. 107. All
other private corporations, however, are vested incidentally with
this power. The doubts expressed upon this point in Fawcett v.
Charles, 13 Wend. 473, have been conclusively set at rest by the
later authorities. The cases in which a corporator may be expelled
by virtue of the implied power of disfranchisement vested in the
corporate body arrange themselves under three principal heads.
1. Where he has committed some offence which bears no
immediate relation to his corporate duty or character but is in
itself of so infamous a nature as to render the offender unfit to
exercise the franchise and associate with honest men.
2. Where he has committed some offence which relates merely
to his corporate duty or character, and which amounts to a breach
of the condition tacitly or expressly annexed to the franchise.
3. Where he has committed some offence of a mixed nature
which is not only contrary to his duty as a corporator, but also
infamous in its nature and indictable by the law of the land: Rex
v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 5.39; Fawcett v. Charles, 13 Wend. 473 ;
People ex rel. Gray v. M13edical Society of the County of Brie, 24
Barb. 570 ; People ex rel. Thacher v. N. . Commercial Association, 18 Abb. Pr. 271; Commonwealth v. St. Patrick'sBen. Soc.,
2 Binn. 441; Evans v. Philadelphia Club, 50 Penn. St. 107;
People ex rel. Page v. Board of Trade, 45 Ill. 112; State ex rel.
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@-rahark v. Chamber of Commerce, 20 Wis. 63; State ex rel. -Danforth v. -Kuehn, 34 Wis. 229.
The corporation cannot proceed to disfranchise a member for the
first of these causes until he has been indicted therefor by the
civil authorities and convicted by a jury: Wilcock on Mun. Corp.,
sect. 646; Leech v. Harris et al., 2 Brewst. 571.
The corporation may'proceed to disfranchise a member for the
second of these causes without such prior indictment and conviction : Wilcock onMun. Corp., sect. 639. Whether a corporation may
disfranchise for the third of these causes without a prior indictment
and conviction seems doubtful. Mr. Wilcock inclines to believe
that it cannot: Wilcock on Mun. Corp., sect. 640. But see
contra, People ex rel. Thacher v. N. . Commercial Association,
18 Abb. Pr. 271.
The breach of a member's corporate duty is by far the most
frequent cause for expulsion. Every person who becomes a member of a corporation impliedly undertakes to do or to say nothing
which shall be injurious to the interests of the body. If he does,
his corporate rights are justly forfeited, and he may properly be
disfranchised. The implied right of disfranchisement for breach
of corporate duty is in some corporations affected by the provisions
of the by-laws. In many instances, it is true, these are simply
declaratory in their nature, and specify as causes of disfranchisement offences which would of themselves, without any special provision, authorize the corporation to exercise its expelling powers.
Sometimes, however, they prescribe new duties for the corporators,
a breach of which would not of itself constitute valid ground for
disfranchisement' and then annex that penalty in case of such
breach. The validity of such by-laws, and of course therefore of
all disfranchisements effected under them, is to be determined by
various considerations. The by-law must be in its nature reasonable: People ex rel. Gray v. Medical Society of the County of Brie,
24 Barb. 570; Hibernia Fire -EngineGo. v. Commonwealth,, 93
Penn' St. 264; Dawkins v. Antrobus, L. R., 17 Ch. Div. 615,
and must not be opposed to public policy: People ex rel. Doyle v.
X. . Benevolent Society, 3 H n 361; People ex rel. Gray v.
Medical Society of the County of Erie, 24 Barb. 570. The breach
of the duties imposed by it must also appear to be in its nature
clearly injurious to the interests of the corporation. A by-law
authorizing expulsion for non-compliance with mere minor and
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unimportant regulations is void: .Evans v. PkiladelphiaClub, 50
Penn. St. 107.
A deviation from the duties prescribed by the by-laws before
becoming a member of a corporation, will in no case constitute a
valid ground for disfranchisement: People ex rel. Bartlett v.
Medical Society, 32 N. Y. 187.
The following decisions as to what are and what are not sufficient causes for the exercise of the implied power of disfranchisement by corporations of various kinds will best illustrate this
branch of the subject:
CO ,ERCIAL AssocIATroxs.-These are usually established to
promote just and equitable principles in trade, to encourage a
high standard of commercial honor and credit, and to facilitate
the transaction of business. The following offences when particularly specified by the by-laws as causes of disfranchisement
have been held to be properly visited with that penalty. Failure
promptly to comply with the terms of a contract: People ex tel.
Page v. Board of Trade, 45 Ill. 112; even though it be made with
a person not a member of the association : Dickenson v. Chamber
of Commerce, 29 Wis. 45 ; or though it be purely parol and therefore not enforceable at law by virtue of the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds: Id. The obtaining of goods under false pretences, though from a non-member outside the jurisdiction of the
corporation: People ex rel. Thacher v. N. Y. Commercial Association, 18 Abb. Pr. 271. The carrying on of business outside
the rooms of the association either before or after ordinary business
hours: State ex rel. Cuppel v. Ohamber of Commerce, 47 Wis.
670. It seems also that where there is a special provision to that
effect in the by-laws insolvency will form a valid cause for suspension from such associations: 11_oxey's Appeal, 9 Weekly Notes
Cases 441.
The following offences have been held not to furnish sufficient
ground for disfranchisement. The institution of legal proceedings
to prevent the sale of a seat claimed by the relator to whose title
an adverse decision had been rendered by the board of managers:
People ex rel. Elliott v. N. Y. Cotton Exchange, 8 Hun 216.
The refusal to submit to the arbitration of a board after having
once brought suit in the civil courts, although the by-laws specially
provided that if any member should fail to submit to such arbitra-
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tion he might bedisfranchised: State ex rel. Graham v. (hamber
of Gommerce, 20 Wis. 63. The refusal to pay an award rendered
by a board of arbitrators, the by-laws vesting jurisdiction in that
board only in case of wilful and fraudulent breach of conduct, and
the right of appeal to the whole body which was secured by said
by-laws having been denied on the question of jurisdiction merely
without going into the full merits of the controversy : Savannah
Ootton -Exchange v. State, 54 Ga. 668.
See also White v.
Brownell, 2 Daly 329.
B ARDS or, FIRE UNDERWRITERS.-These corporations are established to preserve uniform rates of insuraiice. Apart from all
provisions in the by-laws the charging of lower rates than those
established by the association constitutes valid ground for disfranchisement: People ex rel. Pinckney et al. v. N. Y. Board of Fire
Underwriters,7 Hun 248.
MEDICAL SOcIETIEs.-These associations are generally established for the purpose of regulating and improving the practice of
physic and surgery and for promoting professional intercourse
among their members. The following offences have of themselves
been held valid causes for disfranchisement. The selling out of a
practice and afterwards returning and resuming business in the
same locality to the prejudice of the vendee: Barrows v. Al edical
Society, 12 Cush. 402. The constant vilifying of the society and
holding oneself out as ready to practice either as an allopath or a
*homeopath at the option of the patient: B x parte Paine, 1 Hill
665. The following offences have been held insufficient to warrant
expulsion. The presentation to the society on entrance of a diploma
insufficient to entitle to membership under the charter of the association: Fawcett v. Charles, 13 Wend. 473.
The advertisement
of a patent instrument, such action being prohibited by a code of
professional ethics adopted by the society: People ex tel. Bartlett
v. igfedical Society, 32 IN. Y. 187. The reception of a fee less
than that prescribed by a tariff adopted by the association, although
the by-laws specially provided that for this offence a member might
be expelled: People ex rel. Gray v. lVedical Society, 24 IBarb.
270. Becoming surety upon the official bond of a colored person
in the state of Georgia, after the War of the Rebellion, or giving
bail in said state at said time for a colored person charged with
riot: State v. Georgia 11Iedical Society, 38 Ga. 608.
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IBENEFICIAL AssoCIATIONs.-These are organized for mutual
assistance in case of death or sickness. It has been held that it
is sufficient cause for disfranchisement from these associations, if a
member alters a physician's bill so as to entitle himself to greater aid
from the society : Commonwealth v. PhilanthropicSociety, 5 Binn.
486. And where that penalty is specially affixed by the by-laws,
if he voluntarily enlists as a soldier for active service: Franklin
Beneficial Association v. OommonivealthI, 10 Penn. St. 357; or feigns
sickness in order to obtain aid: Society for the Visitation of the
Sick v. Commonwealth, 52 Penn. St. 125 ; or fails to pay his dues:
Hussey v. Gallagher,61 Ga. 86; Hibernia Fire -Engine Co. v.
Commonwealth, 93 Penn. St. 264; contra, People ex tel. Pulford
v. Fire Department, 31 Mich. 458. The following offences have,
on the contrary, been deemed insufficient cause for disfranchisement,
although that penalty was specially annexed to them by the by-laws.
The vilifying of a fellow member: Commonwealth v. St. Patricle's
Ben. Soo., 2 Binn. 440. Neglect to take the sacrament according
to the specified form of a certain religious body, where the corporation is in its nature purely secular: People ex r'el. Schmitt v. St.
Eranciscus Beneficial Society, 24 How. Pr. 216. The failure to
pay dues after an illegal suspension: People ex r'el. Doyle v. .
Y. Benevolent Society, 3 Hun 361. And in no event when a member has once been fined for the commission of an offence can he
afterwards be expelled for the same cause: Id.
SOCIAL CLUBS.-In -Evansv. PhiladelphiaClub, 50 Penn. St.
107, it was held that the striking of one member by another in the
bar room of the club upon considerable provocation was not sufficient cause for disfranchisement, under a by-law providing for
expulsion in case of disorderly conduct. This case was, however,
decided by a divided court and carries no great weight. In the
recent case of Dawkins v. Antrobus, L. R., 17 Ch. Div. 615, where
the expulsion was from an unincorporated society, Sir GEORGE
JESSEL, the Master of the Rolls, indicated it as his opinion that
the publication of a libellous pamphlet on another member of the
club and sending the same to him anonymously would not have
been deemed adequate cause for disfranchisement had the club been
incorporated. Lord Justice JAmES, however, thought otherwise.
See Hfopkinson v. ilarquis of -Exeter,L. R., 5 Eq. 63 ; Labouchere v. Earl of Wharncliffe, L. R., 13 Oh. Div. 346.
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EDUCATIONAL AND CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS.-A

member. of

the-faculty of such institutions may be expelled for neglect of duty:
Murdock's Case, 7 Pick. 303; but not for mere jealousy of other
members of the faculty, or for a settled difference of opinion from
them as to the proper methods of instruction: Id.
A trustee of such institutions may be expelled or charging the
corporation with money never paid: Commonwealth v. Guardians
of he Poor, 6 S. & R. 469. But not for mere misappropriations
of the funds: Id; or for disrespect to his associates, or for failure
to serve on a single committee to which he had been appointed:
-Fuller v. Plainfield Academic School, 6 Conn. 532.
The inmates of such institutions may in pursuance of the provisions. of the by-laws be properly expelled for gross disorder:
People ex rel. .Newman v. "Sailors'Snug Harbor, 54 Barb. 532.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETIEs.-The charters of these societies usually
provide that the corporators thereof shall consist only of such persons as are members of a specified religious body: German Beformed Church v. Seibert, 3 Barr 282. But this is not always
the case: People ex rel. lDilcher v. St. Stephens' Church, 53 N. Y.
103. Where the charter does so provide it is exclusively for the
religious body of itself by means of its regularly organized ecclesiastical courts to determine who are its members and who are not,
and these courts may therefore of course deprive any one of his
corporate rights for purely ecclesiastical offences, such as non-conformity, contumacy or immorality. Their decisions upon these
points will never by reviewed by the civil tribunals. In cases,
however, where they undertake to exercise a like power when the
offence in question is not purely ecclesiastical in its nature, a grave
question arises as to whether they have not overstepped the limits
of their authority. Could, for example, an ecclesiastical court
disfranchise a member for the use of alcoholic drinks or tobacco ?
Common sense would clearly seem to dictate that they could not,
but authority is lacking upon this subject. See note to Gartinv.
Penilck, 9 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 210.
Where the charter makes no such provision as that above described it seems that a religious corporation has no power to disfranchise a member for mere moral delinquency: People ex rel.
Dileher v. St. Stephens' Church, 53 N. Y. 103.
In Illinois and Maryland somewhat different principles obtain
with reference to the right of disfranchisement from private cor-
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porations from those above laid down. All associations for moral,
social or beneficial purposes are deemed, though incorporated, to
stand as regards their powers of expulsion upon the same footing as unincorporated societies. They are left therefore to enfarce their own rules and regulations as they see fit, and may disfranchise for whatever cause they may deem proper: People ex
rel. Rice x,. Board of Trade, 80 Ill. 134, overruling People ex rel.
Page v. Boardof Trade, 45 Ill. 112 ; Anaeosta Tribe of Bed M1,en
v. Murbach, 13 Md. 91. The law upon this point in Illinois is
by no means, however, to be considered as settled: Baxter v. Board
of Trade, 83 Ill. 147; Sturges v. Board of Trade, 86 Ill. 441.
See as to the rights of unincorporated societies in this respect:
Innes v. Wylie et al., 1 Carr. & K. 257; Blisset v. Daniel, 10
Hare 493; Hopkinson v. 3farquis of Exeter, L. R., 5 Eq. 63;
Fisher v. Heane, L. R., 11 Ch. Div. 353; Laboueherev. -Earlof
Wharncliffe, L. R., 13 Oh. Div. 346; Dawkins v. Antrobus, L.
R., 17 Oh. Div. 615; White v. Brownell, 2 Daly 329: People
ex rel.'Dileherv. St. Stephens' Church, 53 N.Y. 103; Xl'oxey's Appeal, 9 Weekly Notes (Phila.) 441; Smith v. Neilson, 18 Vt. 511.
In England it seems to be held that a defect of original qualification for membership in a corporation constitutes good ground for
disfranchisement :.Regina v. Saddlers' Co., 10 H. L. Cas. 404;
Fawcett v. Ciharles, 13 Wend 473. In America the contrary has
been held to be the law.
II. In what manner must a member be disfranchised.
In order legally to disfranchise a member of a corporation the
proceedings must be taken in a certain specified manner. if the
charter provides what that manner shall be, its requirements must
be strictly complied with, otherwise the attempted disfranchisement
will be void: Commonwealth v. Pike Beneficial Society, 8 W. &
S. 247. If there be no express charter provision the method
of disfranchisement may be regulated by the by-laws: State v.
Trustees of Vincennes University, 5 Ind. 77; Commonwealth v.
German Society, 15 Penn. St. 251. And these by-laws may be so
framed as to limit the implied power of expulsion vested in the
corporation: People ex rel. Godwin v. American Institute, 44
How. Pr. 468. Where the terms of the by-laws prescribe the
method of expulsion, that method must be strictly followed by the
society: Fisher v. .eane, L. R., 11 Ch. Div. 353; Labouchere
v. Earl of Warncliffe, 13 Id. 346; Commonwealth v. Guardians
VOL. XXX.-88
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of the Poor, 6 S. & R. 469; Washington Beneficial Society v.
Bacher, 20 Penn. St. 425; Society for the Visitation of the Sick
v. Commonwealth, 52 Id. 125; Savannah Cotton Exchange v.
State, 54 Ga. 668; Weber et al. v. Zimmerman, 22 Md. 156;
People ex rel. Godwin v. American Institute, 44 How. Pr. 468;
Southern Plank Road Co. v. Hixon, 5 Ind. 165. Unless there
be an express provision in the charter no member'of a corporation
can be disfranchised without notice to him, and unless a fair opportunity be given him to defend himself against the charges that
have been preferred: Wilcock on Mun. Corp., sects. 691, 700:
Bagg's Case, 11 Rep. 99; .nnes v. Wylie et al., 1 Carr. & 0.
257; Blisset v. Daniel, 10 Hare 493; Fisher v. Keane, L. B.,
11 Oh. Div. 353; People ex rel. Dilcher v. St. Stephens' 0hurch,
53 N. Y. 103; People ex rel. Doyle v. N. Y. Benevolent Society,
3 Hun 361; Wachtel v. Noah Widows' and Orphans' Beneficial
Society, 84 N. Y. 28; People ex rel. Schmitt v. St. Franciscus
Benevolent Society, 24 How. Pr. 216; Commonwealth v. Penna.
Ben. Soc., 2 S. & R. 141; Commonwealth v. German Society,
15 Penn. St. 251; Diligent Fire Engine Co. v. Commonwealth,
75 Id. 291; Dubree v. Reliance Fire Engine Co., 1 Weekly
Notes (Phila.) 524; Riddell v. Harmony Fire -Engine Co., 8 Phila.
~furdock v. Phillips Acad311; Murdock's Case, 7 Pick. 303;
emy, 12 Pick. 244; Sleeper v. Franklin Lyceum, 7 R. I. 523;
Sibley v. Carteret Olub of Elizabeth, 40 N. J. Law 295; Southern
Plank Road Co. v. Nixon, 5 Ind. 165; State v. Adams, 44 Mo.
570; People v. Fire -Department,31 Mich. 458; State v. Ohamber of Commerce, 47 Wis. 670. And so far has this doctrine as
to notice been carried that it has been held irregular for a committee of the corporation who have been appointed to inquire into
an alleged offence to proceed without notifying a dilinquent, and
an expulsion founded upon the report of such committee after due
notice to the offending member has been pronounced void: Eabouqhere v. Earl of Wharncliffe, L. B., 13 Oh. Div. 346. The
conferring of express power by the charter upon a corporation to
disfranchise its members does not do away with the necessity of
notice: Delacey v. Neuse River Navigation Co., 1 Hawks (N. 0.)
274. And a by-law authorizing expulsion without notice is
simply void: People v. Fire Department, 31 Mich. 458.
The mere posting of the name of the offending member in the
corporate premises is not sufficient notice: Sibley v. Carteret Club
of Elizabeth, 40 N. J. Law 295. The notice must, in the absence of
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any provision in the charter or by-laws, be a personal one: Wachtel
v. .Noah IVidows' and Ophans' Ben. Soc., 84 N. Y. 28.
Provision may, however, be made by the by-laws for other methods of transmitting the notice, as, for example, through the mail.
A mere change of residence does not excuse the failure to serve
a notice, even though there be a provision in the by-laws requiring
each member to notify the society whenever he makes such change,
under plnalty of a fine: Id. Nor will a long and continuous violation of the rules of the society excuse the service of the notice:
Harnmstead v. Washington Fire Co. et al., 8 Phila. 331.
The notice may properly be served on Sunday if the meetings
of the corporation are usually held on that day: People ex rel.
Clorrigan v. Young Hens' Father Hatthew Ben. Soc., 65 Barb.
357 : but must be served a reasonable time before the meeting convened to pass upon the question of the expulsion of the member,
and must specify the time and place of such meeting: Wilcock on
Afun. Corp. 692 : lm-urdoc v. PhillipsAcademy, 12 Pick. 244.
The notice must contain a reasonably specific statement of the
charges preferred against the member, though they need not be
set out with the nicety and precision of an indictment: Wilcock on
Mun. Corp. 694; JlAurdock's CGase, 7 Pick. 303; 11lurdock v. Phillips Academy, 12 Id. 244; Fuller v. Plabifield Academic School,
le
6 Conn. 532.
If a mhember appears without notice and defends or admits the
charges made against him, the necessity for notice is, of course,
dispensed with: Wilcock on 'Mun. Corp. 695; M1oxey's Appeal, 9
Weekly Notes (Phila.) 441; Commonwealth v. Pnna. Ben. Society, 2 S. & R. 141. In order to enable a member to prepare his
defence, access to all the books and papers of the corporation should
be afforded him, and a refusal to allow him to inspect these will
invalidate his subsequent expulsion: Aifurdocc v. Phillips Acadeny, 12 Pick. 244.
The power of disfianchisement is said to be reposed at common
law in the whole corporate body: Grant on Corp. 240; Wilcock
on Mun. Corp. 629; Weber v. Zimmerman, 22 Md. 156. It is,
therefore, held by some authorities that this power cannot be
reposed in a select body: State ex rel. Graham v. Chamber of
Commerce, 20 Wis. 63; unless there be a provision to that effect
in the charter: State v. Chamber of Commerce, 47 Wis. 670.
It has been held, however, in many instances that it is compe-
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tent for a corporation by its by-laws to delegate this power to a
select number of its members: Wilcock on Mun. Corp. 634: Hussey et al. v. Gallagher,.61 Ga. 86. See Green v. African MT.
E. Society, 1 S. & R. 254. And in other cases the validity of
expulsions by such select bodies acting in pursuance of the bylaws has been assumed without controversy: People ex rel.
Thacher v. N. Y. Commercial Association, 18 Abb. Pr. 271;
White v. Brownell, 2 Daly 329; People ex rel. Page v. Board
of Trade, 45 Ill. 112. But a by-law cannot vest the power of
disfranchisement in a single officer who is made to act at once as
witness and as judge: People ex rel. Pulford v. Fire -Department, 31 Mich. 458; HiberniaFire Engine Co. v. Commonwealth,
93 Penn. St. 2-4.
The body in whom the power of disfranchisement is vested must
also not be prejudiced against the offending member. It cannot
consist, therefore, of the very men against whom the offence in
question has been committed: Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511; and
where a select body has illegally proceeded to expel a member
without notice or trial it cannot afterwards retrace its steps and
expel him in due form: Murdock v. Phillips Academy, 12 Pick.
244. Where the power of expulsion is reposed in the whole corporate body, each member should be notified of the time and place
of the meeting at which the trial is to be held, and also of the
business about to be transacted: TWeber v. Zimmerman, 22 Md.
156. The meeting may be held on Sunday if the corporation has
been accustomed to meet on that day: People ex rel. Corrigan v.
Young Hens" Father M11atthew Ben. Soc., 65 Barb. 357. The
trial must be a fair and open one: State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570;
Murdock's Case, 7 Pick. 303. The accused member must be
allowed a full hearing, the privilege of counsel and an opportunity
to object to the relevancy or competency of any evidence offered
against him: Murdock v. Phillips Academy, 12 Pick. 244. If
he remains silent or fails to appear, the charge must, nevertheless,
be satisfactorily proved: Wilcock on Mun. Corp. 702; People ex
rel. Corrzqanv. Young Mens' FatherMatthew Ben. Soo., 65 Barb.
357. Finally, a solemn sentence must be pronounced upon the
answers and proofs adduced: Murdoc v. Phillips Academy, 12
Pick. 244.
Any deviation from the foregoing course of proceeding is fatal,
and the defect will not be remedied by an affirmance of the sen-
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tence by an appellate tribunal constituted by the corporation,
which has acted with perfect regularity: Id.
Where a member has once been regularly tried by a corporation
and acquitted, it seems that he cannot afterwards be again tried
and expelled for the same offence: Commonwealth v. Guardians
of the Poor, 6 S. & R. 469. But where a member has been irregularly tried and expelled there is nothing to prevent the corporation
from reinstating him in his rights and afterwards proceeding to try
and expel him in due process of law: State ex rel. Cuppel v.
0 zamber of Commerce, 47 Wis. 670. An actual formal vote of
the body vested with the right of disfranchisement is necessary in
order to deprive a member of his corporate rights: Sibley v.
Carteret Club of BEizabeth, 40 N. J. L. 295; State ex rel. Linley v. Bryce, 7 Ohio 414: Harmsteadv. Washington Fire Co. et
al., 8 Phila. 331. Even where the charter expressly vests in the
president and directors power to erase a member's name in case he
commits certain specified offences it seems that definite action by
the body corporate is necessary to disfranchise: Delacey v. Neuse
River Nav qation Go., 1 Hdwks (N. 0.) 274. See also Doremus
v. Dutch Reformed Church, 2 Green Ch. (N. J.) 332.
The right of membership in a corporation is never lost by mere
non-user: State v. Trustees of Vincennes University, 5 Ind. 77.
Unless indeed there be a specific provision to that effect in the
charter: Croker v. Old South Society, 106 Mass. 489.
III. In case of an illegal disfranchisement what remedy will the
courts afford.
Wherever, as has been said, a member of a corporation has been
illegally disfranchised he may apply to the courts for redress and
protection. The courts will, in every case, consider the regularity
of the method in which the disfranchisement has been effected, and
if there be any departure from the course of proceedings above indicated will afford instant relief. They will also in every case inquire
as to the offence which has constituted the cause for disfranchisement. The fact that the offence has been committed is conclusively
settled by the finding of the corporation : see State ex rel. Cuppel
v. Chamberof Commerce, 47 Wis. 670. But whether the commission of the offence does or does not constitute sufficient ground for
disfranchisement is for the court.
In those cases where the offence does not consist of the violation
of a by-law but merely of some alleged breach of a corporator's

702

DISFRANCHISEMENT FROM PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.

implied duty, the court will simply consider whether it is or is not
injurious to the interests of the corporation, and the affording or
withholding of relief will be regulated accordingly: Fawcett v.
Charles, 13 Wend. 473; People ex rel. Dilcher v. St. Stephens'
Church, 53 N. Y. 103; Pebple ex rel. Elliott v. N. Y. Cotton
Exchange, 8 Hun 216; Commonwealth v. Philanthropic Society,
5 Binn. 486 ; Ex parte Paine, 1 1ill 665; Commonwealth v.
Guardiansof the Poor, 6 S. & R. 469 ; )Iurdock's Case, 7 Pick.
303 ; Barrows v. M-edical Society, 12 Cush. 402 ; Fuller v. Plainfield Academic School, 6 Conn. 532; Savannah Cotton -Exchange
v. State, 54 Ga. 668. In those cases where the offence does consist of the violation of a by-law the court will consider (1) whether
the duties imposed by that by-law are reasonable and proper, and
(2) whether the violation of them is so far injurious to the interests
of the corporation as to warrant the imposition of the penalty of
expulsion: People v. N. Y. Benevolent Society, 3 Hun 361;
People v. N. Y. Board of Underwriters, 7 Id. 248; People v.
Medical Society, 32 N. Y. 187; People v. iedical Society, 24
Barb. 570 ; People v. Sailors' Snugf Harbor, 54 Id. 532 ; People
v. St. Franciscus Benevolent Society, 24 How. Pr. 216; Commonwealth v. St. Patrick's Ben. Soc., 2 Binn. 440; Franklin Ben.
Association v. Commonwealth, 10 Penn. St. 357 ; Evans v. Philadelphia Club, 50 Id. 107; Society for the Visitation of the Sick
Fire -Engine Co. v.
v. Commonwealth, 52 Id. 125; Ribernia_
Commonwealth, 93 Id. 264; People v. Board of Trade, 45 Ill.
112; Pulford v. Fire Department, 31 Mich. 458; Dickenson v.
Chamber of Commerce, 29 Wis. 45 ; State v. Chamber of Commerce,
20 Id. 63; State v. Chamber of Commerce, 47 Id. 670; State v.
Georgia M1edical Society, 38 Ga. 608 ; .Hussey et al. v. Gallagher,
61 Id. 86.
The courts will also construe the true meaning of the by-laws:
Franklin Beneficial Society v. Commonwealth, 10 Penn. St. 357;
People v. N. Y. Commercial Association, 18 Abb. Pr. 271; State
v. Chamber of Commerce, 20 Wis. 63; Dickenson v. Chamber of
Commerce, 29 Id. 45; and will decide whether the specific offence
assigned as cause for disfranchisement comes within the meaning
of their provisions: People v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 54 Barb.
532; State v. Georgia Medical Soc., 33 Ga. 608. Of course if
the duties imposed by the by-laws be not reasonable and proper, or
if the breach of them be not injurious to the interests of the cor-
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poration or if the offence in question under a just interpretation
of the by-laws does not amount to such a breach, the disfranchisement cannot be maintained. And even if the by-law in general
be valid and the specified offence within its terms, yet if that particular offence be of such a character as cannot be deemed injurious to the interests of the corporation, the expulsion will not be
sustained: Evans v. PhiladelphiaClub, 50 Penn. St. 107 ;, People
v. JIiechanics' Aid Soc., 22 Mich. 86. Where a person has been
illegally disfranchised from a corporation, the proper remedy is a
writ of mandamus to restore him to his rights: Wilcock on Mun.
Corp. 96; Bagg's Case, 11 Rep. 99; People v. .11edicalSoc., 24
Barb. 570; Evans v. PhiladelphiaClub, 50 Penn. St. 107; Hibernia Fire Engine Co. v. Commonwealth, 93 Id. 264; Sibley v.
C'arteret Club of Elizabeth, 40 N. J. L. 295; Union Church of
Africans v. Sanders, 1 Houst. 100; Fuller v. Plainfield Acadenic School, 6 Conn. 532; People v. Board of Trade, 45 Il.
112; People v. 3lechanics' Aid Soc., 22 Mich. 86; Delacey v.
Neuse River Z'Iavgation,0o., 1 Hawks (N. C.) 274; State v. Georgia 3ledical Soc. 33 Ga. 608 ; Hussey et al. v. Gallagher, 61 Id.
86; State v. Lusitanian Portuguese Soc., 15 La. Ann. 73. But
in Kentucky, under the statutes there in force, a writ of mandamus
cannot be granted to restore a member of a private corporation:
Cook v. College of Physicians, 9 Bush 542.
The courts are always unwilling to interfere in the matters of
private corporations: Hussey et al. v. Gallagher,61 Ga. 86; and
hence -will refuse to grant a writ of mandamus where the desired
object may be obtained without serious difficulty and without the
aid of the court: Harrisonet al. v. Simonds et al., 44 Conn. 318.
Any person invoking the aid of the court must, therefore, in
order to obtain the writ, show that he has an undoubted grievance,
and that he has no other adequate remedy. He must, therefore,
prove that he has been duly elected a member of the corporation,
and if that body have exceeded their chartered powers in electing
him he has no standing in court: -DiligentFire -Engine Co. v.
ommonwealth, 75 Penn. St. 291. He must also show beyond
peradventure that he has been disfranchised: People v. St. Stephens'
Church, 53 N. Y. 103. And the mere fact that he has been prevented from voting or speaking at several successive corporate
meetings will not in itself be deemed conclusive evidence of his
disfranchisement: Crocker v. Old South Society, 106 Mass. 489.
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If an opportunity is afforded to him to appeal to another tribunal
constituted by the corporation, he must do so before he has recourse
to the courts: White v. Brownell, 2 Daly 329; German Reformed
Church v. ,Seibert, 3 Penn. St. 282.
Where a person illegally disfranchised from a corporation has
brought suit and recovered damages for the injury done him, he
-will be -deemed to have waived his right to a mandamus: State v.
Lipa, 28 Ohio St. 668.
The practice is for the cburt to issue in the first place h writ of
alternative mandamus: Sleeper v. .Franklin Lyceum, 7 R. I. 523.
The return to this -writ must be certain and specific, containing a
perfect justification of the expulsion, and setting out at length the
cause thereof and the mode in which it has been effected: Bagg's
Case, 11 Rep. 99; People v. St. Pranciscus Ben. Soc., 24 How.
Pr. 216; Green v. African l. -. Soc., 1 S. & R. 254; Society
for the Visitation of the Sick v. Commonwealth, 52 Penn. St.
125 ; People v. .IIfechanics' Aid Soc., 22 Mich. 86. If the return
be defective an opportunity of anendibg it will not be afforded:
People v. American Institute, 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 170.
On the filing of the return the relator may either rely upon its
insufficiency or traverse it by proof. But after having adopted one
of these courses and 'failed, he cannot afterwards resort to the
other: State v. LusitanianP. Soc., 15 La. Ann. 73. Where the
final decision is in favor of the relator, a writ of peremptory
mandamus is issued to restorehim to all his corporate rights.
Attempts have from time to time been made to invoke the aid
of courts of equity to restrain by injunction corporate bodies from
illegally disfranchising their members. Such attempts have, however, invariably failed, the courts being of opinion that they have no
jurisdiction in the premises:, Gregg v. Massachusetts lfedical
Soc., 111 Mass. 185 ; Sturges v. Board of Trade, 86 Ill. 441.
Attempts have also been made to induce these courts to restore
illegally disfranchised members by mandatory injunction. These
also have failed: Fisher v. Board of Trade, 80 Ill. 85. The mere
circumstance that the complainant may be deprived of intermediate
profits earned by the corporation will not entitle him to this relief,
at least where a proceeding by mandamus has been instituted to
test his right and is still pending undetermined: Baxter v. Board
of Trade, 83 Ill. 147.
LAWRENCE LEWIS, Jr.

REGINA v. LOVELL.

RECENT ENGLISH

(own

DECISIONS.

Cases Reserved.

REGINA v. LOVELL.
It is larceny for a person to demand and receive by intimidation and threats an
excessive overcharge for work done for the party paying, as, 5s. 6d.for a fair charge
of Is. 3d.
legina v. J.cGrath, L. R., 1 C. C. 1R.205, affirmed.

TRE prisoner was tried before the chairman of the Worcestershire

Quarter Sessions on an indictment which charged him, in the first
count, with stealing the sum of 5s. 6d., the property of Eliza
Grigg, and, in the second count, with demanding with menaces
from the said Eliza Grigg the sum of 5s. 6d., with intent to steal
the same. The facts were these :
The prisoner was a travelling grinder. He ground two pairs of
scissors for the prosecutrix, for which he charged her 4d. She then
handed him six knives to grind. He ground them and demanded
She refused to pay the amount on the
5s. 6d., for the work.
ground that the charge was excessive. The prisoner then assumed
a menacing attitude, kneeling on one knee, and threatened the
prosecutrix, saying, "You had better pay me, or it will be worse
for you," and "I will make you pay."
The prosecutrix was frightened, and in consequence of her fears,
gave the prisoner the sum demanded. Evidence was given that the
trade charge for grinding the six knives would be Is. 3d. It was
contended for the prisoner that as some money was due, the question rested simply on a quantum meruit, and that there was no
larceny or menacing demand with intent to steal. The chairman
overruled the objection, and directed the jury on the authority of
Req. v. MTeGrath, L. R., 1 0. 0. R. 205, that if the money was
obtained by frightening the owner, the prisoner was guilty of larceny. They found that the money was obtained from the prosecutrix by menaces, and that the prisoner was guilty.
The question for this court was, whether upon the facts stated,
he was properly convicted.
No counsel appeared.
The court, Lord COLERIDGE, 0. J.,
VOL.

_XX.-89
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and BowErN, JJ., held that the case was governed by Beg. v. AreG-rath, and upheld the conviction.
Although larceny generally involves
an unlawful taking-a trespass-against,
or at least without the consent of the
owner, yet it is familiar law that fraud
and intimidation often supplies the place
of force, and assent obtained under such
circumstances has no legal effect.
Therefore, it is well settled that if a
person, with an existing intent to steal,
burrows or hires property, and after having thus obtained possession by consent
of the owner, sells the same, or otherwise
converts it 'to his own use, animojhrqndi,
he is as much guilty of larceny as if he
had acquired possession of the same by
force or violence : State v. Uumphrey, 32
Vt. 569 ; Commonwealth v. Barry, 124
Mass. 325 ; Armstrong's Case, 1 Lew. C.
0. 273; Spence's Case, Id. 197; Starie v. The Commomwealth, 7 Leigh 752;
State v. Watson, 41 N. H. 533; Smith
v. The People, 53 N. Y. 111, and many
other cases.
. In such cases, however, it seems essential that the fraudulent intent should
have existed at the time of acquiring the
possession. . It is a substitute for unlawful taking, and, therefore, if the property
was acquired without wrongful in:ent,
and afterwards, for the first time, the
intent to steal arises, an unlawful conversion would not then amount to larceny,
whatever other crime it might be: Regina v. Cole, 2 Cox C. 0. 340; Charlewood Case, 2 East P. 0. 689 ; Senmple's
Case, Id. 691.
For similar reasons intimidation,
threats, &c., have been held equivalent

to fraud or stratagem in obtaining possession, as held in the principal case, and
many others. Thus itt Reg. v. MacGrath,
I1 Cox C. C. 347, a woman standing in
a mock auction room was falsely charged
by the auctioneer with having bid 26s.
for an article being sold, and beitg
threatened with arrest if she did not pay
the 26s. did so, through fear, and actually
carried away the article itself. But the
auctioneer was held guilty of larceny of
the 26s. And see Taplin's Case, 2 East
P. C. 712 ; Zink v. The People, a Abb.
N. C. 413.
But -it must be cofnfessed this is carrying the doctrine much further than the
cases upon fraud do; for in the principal
case and 31acGrath's Case, not only did
the prosecutor part with his possession,
but also with the property itself. He
intended, through fear no doubt, but still
intended to part with his property in the
thing transferred, whereas in the case of
fraud, &c., it is universally agreed that
if a person is induced by fraud to part
with his property, or title in the thing
delivered, and not merely with his temporary possession, the person acquiring
it is not, by reason of the fraud, guilty
of larceny, but only of obtaining goods
or money under false pretences, or, perhaps, also of cheating at common law:
Ross v. The People, 5 Hill 294 ; Smith
v. The People, 53 N. Y. II ; L6ewer v.
The Commonwealth, 15 S. & R. 93 ;
Commonwealth v. Barry, 124 Mass. 325,
and many other cases.
EDN3UND H. BENNETT.

